

# Tracking Down the Cyber Criminals: Revealing Malicious Infrastructures with OpenDNS

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*“The best place to hide anything is in plain view.”*

Edgar Allan Poe  
"The Purloined Letter"

# Global Network Built Into the Fabric Of the Internet

**ZERO**  
added latency

peer w/top 500 ISPs & CDNs

**100%**  
uptime  
since 2006

400+ Gbps capacity,  
DDoS protection &  
global fail-over


**2%**  
worldwide  
activity

globally-shared  
DNS cache

# Some Security Graph Metrics


## GLOBAL NETWORK

- 90B+ DNS requests/day
- 65M+ biz & home users
- 100% uptime
- Any port, protocol, app




## UNIQUE ANALYTICS

- security research team
- automated classification
- BGP peer relationships
- 3D visualization engine




## SECURITY GRAPHS


- > 10 TB/day
- ~46M nodes per day
- ~174M edges per day



# Gather Intelligence At the DNS Level




# Observable Elements During the Attack Lifecycle



## OBSERVABLE ELEMENTS



# One Domain to Rule Them All!



# And Traditional Domain Reputation Techniques Are No Longer Effective

- Domain Reputation is not effective on Identifying certain groups of threats such as Exploit Kits or Domain Shadowing
  - Malicious domains move quickly from IP to IP
  - Legitimate domains may be compromised to distribute malware
  - Malware can use DGA/Domain Shadowing
- Conceived for an Internet of 10 years ago







Who Says That a Crystal Ball Is the Only Way to Predict Cyber Attacks?




# A Diamond (And a Bunch of Math) Can Help!



# Making Sense of Data



# How Security Classification Works



# Predictive Detectors Used by OpenDNS

- SecureRank
- Co-Occurrences
- NLPRank
- DGA Detectors
- Spike Detectors
- Predictive IP Space Monitoring



# SecureRank

- Abstract DNS traffic in a bipartite graph
- Color the graph with different shades of “red” to indicate bad domains, and “green” for good ones.
- There are clusters of ‘red’ separated from “green” zones with few intra links.
- **Domains requested by known infected clients but never requested by clean ones are most likely to be bad.**
- **SecureRank2 is designed to identify these domains**




# Assigning a Score to Malicious Domains

$$SR_{Domain} = \sum \frac{SR_{client}}{L_{client}}$$


$$SR_{client} = \sum \frac{SR_{Domain}}{L_{Domain}}$$

$$SR_C(A) = SR_D(D_1) + SR_D(D_2) + SR_D(D_3) + \frac{SR_D(D_4)}{2}$$

$$SR_C(B) = \frac{SR_D(D_4)}{2} + SR_D(D_5) + SR_D(D_6)$$



$$SR_D(D_4) = \frac{SR_C(A)}{4} + \frac{SR_C(B)}{3}$$



<https://labs.opendns.com/2013/03/28/secure-rank-a-large-scale-discovery-algorithm-for-predictive-detection/>

# The Algorithm in Action

## Link Analysis

- March through global DNS query data and map the requestor-requestee pairs as a graph.

## Initialize

- Negative ranks to known blacklisted domains and positive ranks to known whitelisted domains.

## Iteration


- Run The Algorithm through different iterations

## Final Rank

- Final ranks are generated when the ranks converge after a number of iterations.

## Clients


## Domains






# Co-Occurrences

- Sequence of DNS requests to domains that co-occur within seconds of each other across a statistically significant number of streams.
- For a domain, being a co-occurrence is not necessarily a bad thing.
- But what if one of the domains involved is part of a malicious campaign?




**CO-OCCURRENCES**  
domain-to-domain  
request sequences via  
**recursive DNS**

# Co Occurrences can be correlated with more “traditional” Techniques




## CO-OCCURRENCES

domain-to-domain  
request sequences via  
**recursive DNS**



**PASSIVE DNS & WHOIS**  
present & past relationships for  
domains-to-IP/nameserver/email  
via **authoritative DNS & DNS  
registrars**



**INFRASTRUCTURES**  
domain-to-IP-to-AS  
relationships via graphing  
**BGP routing data**

# NLPRank

Identifies malicious domain-squatting and targeted C2 or phishing domains

1

Read APT reports



2

Patterns in domains used in attacks

- Domain spoofing used to obfuscate
- Often saw brand names and terms like “update”
- Examples:  
update-java[.]net  
adobe-update[.]net

3

Checked data & confirmed intuition

- Dictionary & company names merged
- Change small # of characters to obfuscate
- Domains hosted on ASNs unassociated w/company
- Different webpage fingerprints

4

Built model and continue to tune

- Detects fraudulent brand domains:

 1linkedin.net

 linkedin.com

# NLPRank Detections: DarkHotel

- adobeupdates[.]com


## DETAILS FOR ADOBEUPDATES.COM

This domain is currently in the OpenDNS Security Labs block list

Classifier prediction: suspicious    OpenDNS Security Graph Score: **-64**

Search in  
Google

Download as  
CSV



- microsoft-xpupdate[.]com

## DETAILS FOR MICROSOFT-XPUPDATE.COM

One or more of the IP addresses that this domain resolves to are currently blocked by OpenDNS

This domain is currently in the OpenDNS Security Labs block list


This domain has a suspicious ASN score

This domain has a suspicious prefix score

Classifier prediction: suspicious    OpenDNS Security Graph Score: **-97**

Search in  
Google

Download as  
CSV



# NLPRank Detections: Carbanak

- update-java[.]net

## DETAILS FOR UPDATE-JAVA.NET

One or more of the IP addresses that this domain resolves to are currently blocked by OpenDNS


This domain is currently in the OpenDNS Security Labs block list

This domain has a suspicious ASN score

Search in  
Google

Download as  
CSV

DNS queries



- adobe-update[.]net


## DETAILS FOR ADOBE-UPDATE.NET

This domain is currently in the OpenDNS Security Labs block list

Search in  
Google

Download as  
CSV

DNS queries



# DGA Detection

Identifies malicious domain-squatting and targeted C2 or phishing domains

## “N-gram” analysis

Do sets of adjacent letters match normal language patterns?

yfrscsddkddl.com

qgmcgoqeasgommee.org

iyyxtyxdeyphk.com


diiqngijkpop.ru

## Entropy analysis

Does the probability distribution of letters appear random?


# SPRank

SPRank detects domains showing as a sudden surge, or a spike, in DNS queries



# What Does a Malicious Connection Sounds Like?

What if we could model the traffic spikes as sound waves and identifies “spike behavior” typical of domains used for malware campaigns such as exploit kits, DGAs, fake software, phishing, etc...




Example of An Exploit Kit



Example of a DGA



# Example of a DGA



Spike Detection

# Spike Detection

- New Series of threats such as Exploit Kits or Domain Shadowing make many of the classical domain reputation or IP reputation methods ineffective.
- Spike defined as a jump in traffic over a two hour window.
- Use predetermined threshold. Helps filter out Google, Facebook, etc. □
- Use a MapReduce algorithm to calculate domains that spike.
- Output 50-100k domains each hour.



# Domain History Filter

- Past query history is used to help remove benign domains and focus in Exact Domain Match ones.
- Allows to eliminate all domains with more than X consecutive non- zero hours of traffic.
- Based on current EK domains traffic patterns, only keep domains that feature Y consecutive most recent non-zero hours of traffic.



# Query Type Filter

- Look at past history, DNS Query types, all existing DNS records of a domain, unique IPs, unique resolvers, etc.
- Partition based on Query types Distribution:
  - ✓ 1 – A Record
  - ✓ 15 – MX Record
  - ✓ 16 – TXT Record
  - ✓ 99 – SPF Record
  - ✓ 255 – ANY Record



# Domain Records Filter

- Check for all DNS records available for a domain: the existence/non-existence of certain records helps narrow down the purpose of a domain.
- Partition based on DNS records:
  - A
  - MX
  - TXT
  - CNAME
  - NS, specific name servers, indicative of compromise or malware



# Empirical Data on the Model Efficacy

On Average, only

**16%**

of security vendors catch the domains identified by SPRank.

Of the **200** domains,  
observed in a one hour period,

**70**

of the compromised domains had not been identified by any other vendor.

SPRank has a

**100%**


success rate of discovering malicious domains before other security vendors (tested hourly against VirusTotal).

<https://blog.opendns.com/2015/11/19/opendns-cracks-predictive-security/>

# Predictive IP Space Monitoring


Predictive IP Space Monitoring is used to further drill into associated indicators by analyzing 8 different recorded hosting patterns:

- Compromised domains, i.e. “domain shadowing”
- Domain shadowing on multiple hosting IPs
- Sibling peripheral ASNs and bulk malware IP setup
- Leaf ASNs
- Offshore registration and diversification of IP space
- Rogue ASN and affiliated hosters
- Abuse of large hosting providers
- Shady hosts within larger hosting providers



# Expanding The Selection

Predictive IP Space Monitoring expands the selection of SPRank, to determine which **domains will be the source of future malicious activity.**



<https://blog.opendns.com/2015/11/19/opendns-cracks-predictive-security/>



# Pivoting Through the Attack Infrastructure with Just one Piece of Information (1/2)

## Alerts and risk scores

Summarise the suspicious activity identified for the domain


This domain has a suspicious ASN score

This domain is associated with the following attack: APT C&C

Geo distance between hosts serving this domain is fairly high

## Global Requests Patterns

Shows an abnormal spike in traffic, which highlights when the attack launched



## Analysis of IP Requester Location

Shows the vast majority of requests for this domain are coming from people located in a certain country, which could signify a more targeted attack



## Domain Tagging

Shows history of when the malware was associated with malware or botnet activity

### DOMAIN TAGGING

Period	Category	URL
Sep 23, 2015 - Current	Botnet	

## IP Geography Analysis

Reveals the domain is hosted by IP addresses on different networks in more than 20 countries, which, for instance, is unusual for legitimate country code top-level domains.



## WHOIS Record Data

Shows the domain was recently created and registered by someone who used the same email address to register other malicious domains

### WHOIS RECORD DATA

Registrar Name: Regtime Ltd. (R455-LRMS) IANAID: 1362 Last retrieved July 30, 2015 [Get latest](#)

Created: December 9, 2014 Updated: June 15, 2015 Expires: December 9, 2015 [Raw data](#)

Email Address	Associated Domains	Email Type	Last Observed
<a href="mailto:dennisletvov02@mail.ru">dennisletvov02@mail.ru</a>	2 Total - 2 malicious	Administrative, Registrant, Technical	Current

# Pivoting Through the Attack Infrastructure with Just one Piece of Information (2/2)

## Mappings of IP prefixes and ASNs

Highlights where the domain is hosted and confirm it's a "bad neighbor" of many other malicious domains. Pivot on the IP or ASN for more details.

AS 3462

### CURRENT INFORMATION

Period	Creation date	Registry	Network Owner Description
Mar 29, 2014 - Nov 19, 2015	2002-08-01	APNIC	HINET Data Communication Business Group TW B6400
Dec 5, 2012 - Mar 29, 2014	2002-08-01	APNIC	HINET Data Communication Business Group B6400
Oct 25, 2012 - Dec 5, 2012	2002-08-01	APNIC	HINET Data Communication Business Group

## Anomaly Detection

Identifies that this is a fast flux domain, a technique used to hide malware sites behind IPs that are constantly changing

This domain might be a fast flux

First seen	Last seen	IPs
11/18/15	11/18/15	174.101.68.37 (TTL: 0) 24.66.225.70 (TTL: 0) 73.38.63.24 (TTL: 0) 76.98.101.228 (TTL: 0) 77.121.15.194 (TTL: 0) 89.69.82.51 (TTL: 0)
11/17/15	11/17/15	109.87.199.28 (TTL: 0) 31.170.140.139 (TTL: 0) 37.193.33.48 (TTL: 0) 5.58.74.104 (TTL: 0) 74.67.21.220 (TTL: 0) 78.139.185.21 (TTL: 0) 79.114.134.172 (TTL: 0) 86.106.147.14 (TTL: 0) 89.28.63.99 (TTL: 0)

## Related Domains and Co-Occurrences

Identify other domains that were queried with a high statistical frequency right before or after this one and are likely related to the same attack.

### CO-OCCURRENCES

[www.dondetucmpras.es](http://www.dondetucmpras.es) (46.33) [aondeconvem.com.br](http://aondeconvem.com.br) (31.02) [corporate.doveconviene.it](http://corporate.doveconviene.it) (22.65)

### RELATED DOMAINS

[www.dondetucmpras.es](http://www.dondetucmpras.es) (13) [aondeconvem.com.br](http://aondeconvem.com.br) (9) [123contactform.com](http://123contactform.com) (7) [corporate.doveconviene.it](http://corporate.doveconviene.it) (6) [www.dondelocmpromx.mx](http://www.dondelocmpromx.mx) (5) [forms.doveconviene.it](http://forms.doveconviene.it) (3) [cdn.lubenda.com](http://cdn.lubenda.com) (3)

## Passive DNS Data

Provides insight into the history of the mapping between domains and IPs: this domain was associated with different IPs when detected the first time.

First seen	Last seen	IPs
11/18/15	11/18/15	174.101.68.37 (TTL: 0) 24.66.225.70 (TTL: 0) 73.38.63.24 (TTL: 0) 76.98.101.228 (TTL: 0) 77.121.15.194 (TTL: 0) 89.69.82.51 (TTL: 0)
11/17/15	11/17/15	109.87.199.28 (TTL: 0) 31.170.140.139 (TTL: 0) 37.193.33.48 (TTL: 0) 5.58.74.104 (TTL: 0) 74.67.21.220 (TTL: 0) 78.139.185.21 (TTL: 0) 79.114.134.172 (TTL: 0) 86.106.147.14 (TTL: 0) 89.28.63.99 (TTL: 0)

## Named Threat Attribution


Confirms that the domain was associated with a particular malware family or botnet C&C.

This domain is associated with the following attack: ZBot Fast Flux Botnet

**Starting from a single piece of data, it is possible to quickly investigate the domain leveraging a single, correlated source and speed up incident response.**

# Visualizing Data with OpenGraphiti

- OpenGraphiti, is the Open Source interactive data visualization engine developed by OpenDNS.
- Used by security analysts and researchers, it pairs visualization and Big Data to create 3D representations of threats.
- **The basic concept is that information is processed more efficiently when it is presented in visual rather than text form.**
- OpenGraphiti can uncover sophisticated behaviors and relationships associated with cyber-attacks.



# Using Semantic Networks to Visualize Threats

- Graph = Set of Nodes
- Node = Concept, Edge = Relationship
- Agents populate the graph
- A semantic network can be represented as a graph connecting any kind of information by any kind of relationship
- They can be used to model nearly everything and can be applied to a wide range of problems



"ZBOT BOTNET"





# Our View of the Internet

providing visibility into global Internet activity (e.g. BGP, AS, WHOIS, DNS)

# Predict and Prevent Attacks Before They Happen

- With its **90+ Billion** DNS requests analyzed per day OpenDNS has a comprehensive and privileged view of the Internet
- The analysis of this massive and diverse dataset allows to build models and detectors able to identify where attacks are staged.
- Starting from a single piece of information it is possible to pivot through the malicious infrastructure, **exposing** attackers and **predicting** their moves before they happen
- On the other hand, the Internet is not unlimited, so there are zones more prone to be exploited by criminals, or even recycled.

Thank you